Game theory is an established branch of mathematics that offers a rich set of mathematical tools for multi-person strategic decision making that can be used to model the interactions of decision makers in security problems who compete for limited and shared resources. This article presents a review of the literature in the area of game theoretical modelling of network/cybersecurity.
Static and dynamic games
Games considered in game theory are broadly classified as being the static or dynamic games [9, 10] . In static games the players choose their strategies simultaneously whereas dynamic games involve a sequence of moves. In dynamic games [38, 39] , a player chooses before others do, knowing that the others' choices will be influenced by his/her publicly observable choice. The dynamic character of the game results in models that can enhance the learning ability of the players. In turn, this learning can help security practitioners to develop high quality theoretical studies on real-life problems. Depending on a particular situation in cybersecurity that are amenable to game theoretical analyses, applying either the static or the dynamic game theory can considered appropriate. For instance, a cybersecurity situation involving a team of attackers and a plan of attack in which the attackers act simultaneously, the application of static game theory will be required. Whereas, dynamic game theory will be applied when some of the attackers act first and the reaction of the defenders is observed before the remaining attackers act while equipped with the knowledge of how the defenders have reacted.
Nash equilibrium
The rule for predicting how a game will be played defines the solution concepts in terms of which the game is understood by the game theorists. The most commonly used solution concept in game theory is that of a Nash equilibrium (NE). Assume there are N players in a game. Let S i and U i for 1 ≤ i ≤ N be the strategy spaces and the payoff, or utility, for each player i, respectively. The individual elements of the strategy space S i for player i are called the pure strategies. The game can then be described [40] by the set G :
G : {N ; S 1 , S 2 , ...S N ; U 1 , U 2 , ...U N } .
(
The presumable outcome of the game is determined by analyzing the behaviour of the players and their strategy choices. Let s = {s 1 , s 2 , ...s N } be the profile of pure strategies with s i ∈ S i . Let s −1 be the profile of strategies excluding player i. A strategy profile s with s = (s i ; s −i ) for all i, is a NE [7, 9, 12, 42, 43] such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N we have
This is also described by stating that the strategy of each player i is a best reply [7, 9, 12] to the strategies of other players. In the cybersecurity context, the defenders' strategy profile that is a NE will consist of a set of defensive strategies, one on the behalf of each defender, such that the strategy of each defender is a best reply to the strategies of the attackers.
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
A mixed strategy [12] is a linear combination, with real coefficients, of two or more pure strategies, with their probability weights summing up to 1. This defines the probability distribution π i = (π i,t ) t∈Si for player i choosing randomly among the pure strategies S i . The expected payoff for the player i is then given [40] bȳ 
A set of probability distributions π i = (π i ) 1≤i≤N defines a mixed NE, or a NE in mixed strategies, such that for all i and any other probability distributionπ i = (π i,t ) t∈Si we have 
A key result of Nash's thesis [42, 43] states that a NE always exists in mixed (randomized) strategies in games where each player has only a finite number of deterministic strategies. In a NE, no one player can improve his/her situation by unilaterally changing his/her strategy. This amounts to stating that each person is doing as well as they possibly can, even if that does not mean that an optimal outcome has been achieved for the collective of the players. In a cyber attack when a NE is determined for a team of defenders, neither is left with any motivation to deviate unilaterally from it.
Prisoners' Dilemma
The game of Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) [7, 9, 12] describes the following situation: a) Two criminals, called in the following as Alice and Bob, commit a crime together and are arrested. As the evidence is being investigated, they wait for their trial, b) Each suspect is offered the opportunity to confess the crime after placing him/her in a separate cell, c) Each suspect may choose between the strategies of confessing (D) or not confessing (C), where C and D represent cooperation and defection, d) If neither of the two confesses, i.e. (C, C), they both go free, and divide between them the proceeds of their crime. We represent this in the following by 3 units of payoff to each prisoner, e) However, if one prisoner confesses (D) and the other does not (C), the prisoner who confesses testifies against his partner in exchange for going free and gets the entire 5 units of payoff. However, the prisoner who did not confess is sent to prison and that is represented by the payoff of 0, f) If both suspects confess, i.e. (D, D), then both are convicted while a reduced term is given to both. This is represented by giving each suspect 1 unit of payoff. This payoff is better than having the other suspect confess, but it is not so good as going free. The game between the prisoners can be represented by the following bimatrix of payoffs:
where the first and the second entry in a bracket correspond to Alice's and Bob's payoff, respectively. Let Alice play C with probability p and play D with probability (1 − p). Similarly, let Bob play C with probability q and play D with probability (1 − q). The players' payoffs for the PD matrix (5) are
The inequalities that define the NE consisting of a pair of mixed strategies (p * , q * ) in PD can then be written as
which produces a unique NE in PD: p * = q * = 0. The NE corresponds to both players playing the pure strategy D. Ref. [41] Utilizes an international relations PD game to present an explanation of the complexities of cyber intrusions and the way forward for nation-states to deal with these new exigencies. PD game is also discussed in the context of cybersecurity in Ref. [53] .
Refinements of Nash equilibrium
Some of the largest problems in security applications come from actions that cannot be anticipated. This makes using NE problematic as the concept presumes that the structure of the game, as well as all possible moves, is a common knowledge among the players. Several refinements of NE have been introduced [8, 11] including sequential equilibrium, proper equilibrium, trembling hand equilibrium, and rationalizability.
Sequential or Stackelberg games
A dynamic model of the duopoly game was proposed by Stackelberg (1934) [10, 44] in which a leader (or dominant) firm moves first and in view of the leader firm's move a follower (or subordinate) firm moves second. For instance, in the early history of US mobile industry, General Motors played this leadership role against more than one firm such as Ford and Chrysler who acted as followers. In the sequential game of duopoly a Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained using the solution concept of backwards-induction outcome of the game. As a solution-concept it is a stronger than that of NE and refers to sequential nature of the game. Multiple NE may appear in sequential move games whereas only one of those is associated with the backwards-induction outcome of the game.
Consider the following simple three step game, a) Player 1 chooses an action a 1 from the set A 1 of his strategies, b) Player 2 observes a 1 and then chooses an action a 2 from the set A 2 of her strategies, c) Payoffs for the two players are U 1 (a 1 , a 2 ) and U 2 (a 1 , a 2 ). It is an example of the dynamic games of complete and perfect information whose key features are, a) Players take their moves in sequence, b) All previous moves are known to the players they make a next move, and c) The players' payoff functions are common knowledge. Given the action a 1 is previously chosen, at the second stage of the game when player 2 takes his turn to make the move he faces the problem:
Assume that for each a 1 in A 1 , player 2's above optimization problem has a unique solution R 2 (a 1 ), which is the best response of player 2. By anticipating player 2's response to each action a 1 that player 1 might take, Player 1 can now solve player 2's optimization problem. So that player 1 faces the problem:
For this NE the players' payoffs in the second stage are U A2 (0, 0) = 1, U B2 (0, 0) = 1. The players' first-stage interaction, therefore, in this two-stage game becomes equivalent to a one-shot game, in which the payoff pair (1, 1) from the second stage is added to their first-stage payoff pair. Write the players' payoffs in the one-shot game as U A(1+2) = U A1 + U A2 (0, 0) = −pq + 4q − p + 2, and U B(1+2) = U B1 + U B2 (0, 0) = −pq + 4p − q + 2. It has again (0, 0) as the unique NE. The unique subgame-perfect outcome of the two-stage PD, therefore, is (0, 0) in the first stage, and it is also (0, 0) in the second stage. The strategy of defection in both the stages comes out as subgame-perfect outcome for the two stage classical PD.
Cooperative games
In cooperative games, players are allowed to form coalitions, binding agreements, pay compensations, make side payments etc and there is a strong incentive to work together to receive the largest total payoff. In their pioneering work on game theory [13] , von Neumann and Morgenstern offered models of coalition formation where the strategy of each player consists of choosing the coalition s/he wishes to join. In coalition games the players' possibilities are described by the available resources of different groups (coalitions) of players and joining a group, or remaining outside, is part of strategy of a player affecting his/her payoff. The notion of a strategy disappears in cooperative game as the main features are those of a coalition and the value or worth of the coalition. The underlying assumption is that each coalition can guarantee its members a certain amount called the value of a coalition [8, 12] . The value of coalition measures the worth the coalition possesses and is characterized as the payoff which the coalition can assure for itself by selecting an appropriate strategy, whereas the 'odd man' can prevent the coalition from getting more than this amount.
An examaple of a three-player symmetric cooperative game is a classical three-person normal form game [47] that is defined by: a) Three non-empty sets Σ A , Σ B , and Σ C that are the strategy sets of the players A, B, and C, b) Three real valued functions U A , U B , and U C that are defined on Σ A × Σ B × Σ C , and c) The product space Σ A × Σ B × Σ C that is the set of all tuples (σ A , σ B , σ C ) with σ A ∈ Σ A , σ B ∈ Σ B and σ C ∈ Σ C .
For this game, a strategy is understood as such a tuple (σ A , σ B , σ C ) and U A , U B , U C are payoff functions of the three players and the game can be denoted as Γ = {Σ A , Σ B , Σ C ; U A , U B , U C }.
Let ℜ = {A, B, C} be the set of players and ℘ be an arbitrary subset of ℜ. The players in ℘ may form a coalition so that, for all practical purposes, the coalition ℘ appears as a single player. It is expected that players in (ℜ − ℘) will form an opposing coalition and the game has two opposing "coalition players" i.e. ℘ and (ℜ − ℘). One of the two strategies 1, 2 is chosen by each of the three players A, B, and C. There is no payoff if the three players choose the same strategy. If the two players choose the same strategy, both receive one unit of money from the 'odd man.' The payoff functions U A , U B and U C for players A, B and C, respectively, are given as [47] :
with similar expressions for U B and U C . Suppose ℘ = {B, C}, hence ℜ − ℘ = {A}. The coalition game represented by Γ ℘ is given by the payoff matrix:
Here the strategies [12] and [21] are dominated by [11] and [22] . After eliminating these dominated strategies the payoff matrix becomes [11] [22]
It is seen that the mixed strategies:
are optimal for ℘ and (ℜ − ℘) respectively. With these strategies a payoff 1 for players ℘ is assured for all strategies of the opponent; hence, the value of the coalition υ(Γ ℘ ) is 1 i.e. υ({B, C}) = 1. Since Γ is a zero-sum game υ(Γ ℘ ) can also be used to find υ(Γ ℜ−℘ ) as υ({A}) = −1. The game is symmetric and one can write
Cooperative game theory has been applied to cybersecurity in a number of studies: In a Masters thesis submitted to the Florida Atlantic University, Golchubian [57] has used cooperative game theory by developing a game theoretical approach to prevent collusion and to incentivize cooperation in cybersecurity contexts. Vakilinia and Sengupta [58] have investigated profit sharing in coalitional game theory using calculation for rewarding the players that is participation-fee. In particular, they analyze the well-known Shapley value concept [9, 10] by formulating a coalitional game between organizations in cybersecurity information sharing system.
Bayesian games
In other situations that are characterized by the players' access to only a partial knowledge about the game, game theory is still shown to be an effective modelling tool by exploiting the concepts from Bayesian games [10] . A Bayesian game is defined as a game of incomplete information in which the players do not have the complete knowledge of the rules of the game. The incomplete knowledge is described by the existence of the so-called state of the Nature, which is decided probabilistically by some relevant random source. In Bayesian games, the probability distribution over the states of Nature is private to each player and which represents its knowledge about the Nature. Nature is allowed to leak some information about its state in the Bayesian games, which is called the signal to the players. With the signal, the players can probabilistically work out their expected utilities. A Bayesian game [56] consists of a tuple N, Ω,
where Ω is the set of natural states, and for each player i ∈ N, a) S i is the set of player i's all available actions, b) T i is the set of player i's signals/types, with τ i : Ω −→ T i is the state-to-signal mapping, c)
Si is the set of i's available actions after receiving t i ∈ T i , d) p i is the probability measure over Ω, and, e) U i : Ω × S −→ R is player i's utility function where R is the set of real numbers. The solution concept of a NE is adapted into Bayesian games and is called Bayesian NE. Some applications of Bayesian games include Liu et al's. [59] computation of Bayesian Nash outcomes for an intrusion detection game and under the conditions of limited information, Johnson et al's [60] determination of Bayesian Nash equilibria for network security games.
Network/cybersecurity and game theory
The information technology landscape has been revolutionized by the recent advances in software and hardware technologies. Cyberspace has now become an integral part of the way the business is conducted. For current telecommunication and information networks, their network/cybersecurity is the main concern and the protection and security of cyberspace infrastructure is of key importance.
Game theory is applied to networks in settings in which agents are connected by physical or virtual links. Given the network structure and the actions of other users of the network, the agents must decide on some action in a strategic manner.
Heterogeneous, large-scale, and dynamic networks define the cyberspace of the present time. Cyberspace has become increasingly complex even within carefully designed network and software infrastructures. Ample and a large attack surface is available for evasive maneuvers of adversaries in the cyberspace. Cyberspace has become characterized by higher computational power and ubiquitous connectivity and these features have given birth to new risks and threats.
The miscreants launching cybersecurity attacks have various degrees of uncertainty and defenders have incomplete information about their intentions and capabilities. Improving cybersecurity thus involves difficult challenges and decision making on multiple levels and over different time scales. The goal of cybersecurity is to provide practical and salable security mechanisms and to enhance the trustworthiness of cyber-physical systems.
As is the case with the physical security, in cybersecurity there exists a wide variety of the agents' utilities, including adversarial and antithetical types. Game theory, therefore, shares many common features with the cybersecurity problem. The success of a cybersecurity scheme depends not only on the actual cyberdefense strategies that have been implemented, but also on the strategic actions taken by the attackers to launch their attacks. Thus these scenarios are well-suited to the game theoretical analyses of the cybersecurity schemes. Such analyses can also be viewed from the perspective of establishing trust. When security is compromised, building trustworthy relationships, and deciding whether to trust received information becomes particularly relevant. It is well known that the trust problem can be formulated as in game-theoretic strategic terms. Trust emerges as an important aspect in the design and analysis of security solutions and the implementations of security games involve several levels of trust.
Network/cybersecurity games
A significant motivation for cybersecurity games comes from earlier applications of game theory to the domain of physical security. These are examples of practical situations that demonstrate the potential for game theory in that domain. Physical security considerations are important at airports, product transportation, national security patrols, etc. Usually, a defender allocates the available resources to defend against an attacker whereas the attacker can attempt to compromise targets that the defender is protecting from possible attacks. Most often, the defender can best allocate resources to minimize the chance of success for the attacker and minimize the cost incurred by the defender. How should the defender allocate agents, patrols, surveillance technology, and other resources to minimize the impact of attackers? Examples of physical security situations include, a) the airport security: where the defender can schedule optimal checkpoints and patrols for their agents, b) the coast guard: more efficiently protection can be provided to ferries or ports that are the targets for theft or terrorism. The finite number of agents and limited resources can be allocated in such ways to best counteract wide scale poaching.
In network/cybersecurity situations, the zero-sum games between malicious attackers and the transmitter-receiver pairs can model the problems of jamming and eavesdropping in communication networks. Attackers and defenders are most often considered as the agents in network security problems. Security games form a basis for formal decision making, algorithm development, and in predicting the behaviour of attackers. Security games can be deterministic or stochastic. They can be sequential or hierarchical (Stackelberg game) in which an agent has a certain information advantage over the others. In cooperative or coalitional security games the agents can cooperate to achieve their strategic objectives. Examples of security games in the network/cybersecurity domain include, i) intrusion detection [5, 75] , ii) privacy concerns [74, 91, 92] , iii) network jamming [77, 78, 81] , and iv) eavesdropping in communication networks [80] .
Scheduling and deployment of patrols is a key operational problem for those who are responsible for the security of airports, art galleries etc. Alpern et al. [48] have presented a class of patrolling games addressing the optimization problem involving randomized, and thus unpredictable, patrols. They have considered the facility to be patrolled as a network or graph Q of interconnected nodes (e.g. rooms, terminals) such that the Attacker has the option to attack any node of Q within a given time T. That is, the attacker requires m consecutive periods that are uninterrupted by the Patroller in order to commit his nefarious act and therefore win. In this approach, the Patroller can follow any path on the graph. The patrolling game turns out to be a win-lose game in which, given best play on both sides, the Value is the probability that the Patroller successfully intercepts an attack.
An Illustrative example
Optimal resource allocation in cybersecurity: Sokri [49] has considered a security game between a attacker a and a defender d in a system for cyberinfrastructure. Let T = {t 1 , t 2 , ..., t n } be a set of n targets that are at the risk of being attacked and S = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s m } a set of resources to protect the targets. Vector a t can represent the attacker's mixed strategy where a t is the probability of attacking the target t. The defender's mixed strategy is the vector p t where the marginal probability of protecting the target t is p t . Players' access to mixed strategies allows them to play probability distributions over their pure strategies. A strategy profile a, p is a combination of (mixed) strategies that the attacker and the defender may play. Let r d (t) be the defender's reward if the attacked target t is covered and c d (t) his cost if the target is uncovered. Similarly, denote by r a (t) the attacker's reward if the attacked target t is uncovered and by c a (t) the attacker's costs if the attacked target t is covered. For the strategy profile a, p following are the expected payoffs of the two players:
The payoffs is Eqs. (15, 16) depend only on the attacked targets and their protection and these payoffs do not consider the targets that are not attacked. Now, if the players move simultaneously, the solution of this cybersecurity game is a NE. However, if the game is played sequentially in which the defender moves first (leader) and commits to a strategy and the attacker (follower) reacts to the defender's move, the Stackelberg equilibrium appears as the standard solution in this leader-follower interaction. Given the defender's strategy p, the attacker's optimization problem can be presented as follows:
s. t.
It is optimal to assign 1 to any a t that is associated with a maximal value of
The dual problem that corresponds to the above has the same optimal solution and it can be formulated as follows:
The complementary slackness condition then becomes:
When the leader problem is completed by including the follower's optimality condition, it becomes a single mixed-integer quadratic problem [50] :
u ∈ R.
Eq. (23) maximizes the leader's expected payoff. The coverage to the available resources (m) is limited by Eq. (24) whereas Eq. (27) restricts the coverage vector to [0, 1]. The leader's mixed strategy is enforced to be feasible by these two constraints. Eq. (26), where M is a large number, is the complementary slackness condition indicating that the follower's payoff u is optimal for every pure strategy with a t > 0. Sokri [49] has considered the example of a game in normal form as shown in the Table 1 and that is adapted from the Refs. [51, 52] . There are 4 targets and two resources that can cover any of the two targets. For each target, there are two payoffs i.e. the payoffs of the attacker and the payoffs of the defender. Each payoff consists of two parts i.e. a reward and a cost. Note that, a) If the target is attacked, the defender can cover a target and get a reward, b) He can also leave the target uncovered and incur a cost if it is attacked, c) If the target is uncovered, the attacker can attack a target and get a reward, and d) If the target is covered he can also incur a cost. By changing the static values in Table 1 to a range of values, an uncertainty can be placed on each variable. Using a three-point estimate (minimum, most likely, and maximum) approach that incorporates this uncertainty, Sokri [49] has determined the following solution, which is found to satisfy all the constraints as well as the numerical convergence criterion: 
Defender
The objective did not move significantly after many iterations, and even if it is heavily defended the attacker preferred to attack the most valuable target. The most likely payoffs have the corresponding cumulative distribution function (CDF). This can now be determined With this solution and the median of the defender's average payoff comes out to be approximately 0.95. This gives a 50% probability that the defender's average payoff will be less than 0.95. The values for minimum and maximum of defender's average payoff are then determined to be 0.4261 and 1.5166, respectively.
Literature survey
There is a significant amount of literature on game theoretical considerations and applications of game theory to network/cybersecurity. The following presents a brief survey of the literature.
Books
Following three books discuss security issues using game theory.
Metcalf and Casey (2016) [53]
This book investigates the mathematical concepts required for effective cybersecurity research and practice. It takes an applied approach for practitioners and students in this field. The topics of methods of statistical exploratory data analysis and visualization are covered and presented as a type of model for making decisions. Also, the topics of graph theory, topological complexes, and persistent homology are discussed. The book proposes that while defending the Internet is surely a complex effort, but applying the right mathematical techniques can make this task manageable.
Alpcan and Basar (2010) [3]
This comprehensive book presents applications of unique quantitative models that are derived from decision, control, and game theories in order to improve the present understanding of diverse network security problems. It presents discussions of attack detection, malware response, privacy, risk management, algorithm and mechanism design. The book provides a system-level theoretical understanding of network security. The book provides an analytical foundation to the security practitioners that is helpful to present in a formal way the decision-making processes involved in network security. The book discusses the required information needed for building and using quantitative models for practical applications. Examples in this regard include intrusion detection, malware epidemics, and risk management.
Buttyan and Hubaux (2008) [54]
This book discusses various techniques for ensuring secure communication and presents the key features of wireless networks. Techniques needed for handling hacking and other forms of attack are discussed. The book also describes cooperation in multi-hop and ad hoc networks.
Conference proceedings
Starting in year 2010 at the Technical University Berlin, Germany, the Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec [30] ) is a series of yearly conferences continuing to date. The goal of the conference is to help a dialogue among academic and industrial researchers in this area. The conference's objective is the identification and discussion of major technical challenges and to report recent results in security studies. These studies in a variety of technological systems highlight the connection between game theory, control, distributed optimization, reputation, economic incentives and real world security, trust and privacy problems.
PhD theses
There are a number of PhD theses including:
Shukla's PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts Amherst (2017)
With the title Game Theory for Security Investments in Cyber and Supply Chain Networks, the thesis [55] attempts to answer the following principal questions: (i) For competing firms in a network, what should their security levels be considering their investment costs or budget constraints to ensure a reduction in the entire network's vulnerability? (ii) If firms in a network cooperate, what are the implications on the network vulnerability? Does cooperation yield more economic/financial benefits? (iii) In a supply chain network for high value cargo with competing freight service providers, what should the shipment sizes and security levels be to ensure reduction in vulnerability?
Pham's PhD thesis, University of London (2015)
With the title Applications of Game Theory in Information Security, several security problems are analyzed using game theory in this thesis [56] . Using game theory, strategies and economic incentives of participants are studied who can be attackers and defenders. Useful insights are provided about the trend of behaviours and decisions that the participants should take. In turn, these would be useful in understanding and predicting the participants' actual courses of actions. The thesis proposes several security solutions such as the protocols or contracts, which along with the assumption of rational security, result in such desirable outcomes in which the attacks do not take place.
Jones' PhD thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology (2013)
With the title Asymmetric Information Games and Cybersecurity, this thesis [61] formulates cybersecurity problems as asymmetric information games among decision makers. By using gametheoretic methods, the optimal policies are then derived for each decision maker. The thesis considers asymmetric games where the state of the world remains fixed over time (repeated games) as well as games where the state of the world can change from stage to stage according to a transition that is dependent on the current state and the moves of both players (stochastic games). The likely behavior of the decision makers and the performance of the system are predicted using the optimal policies.
Zhu's PhD thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (2013)
With the title Game-theoretic Methods for Security and Resilience in Cyber-physical Systems, this thesis [62] considers multiple layers of the cyber-physical systems. New game-theoretic frameworks are developed for security and resilience problems. Examples of the problems discussed include robust and resilient control, smart grid energy systems, management of information security, and secure network routing.
Gueye's PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley (2011)
The title of this thesis [63] is A Game-theoretical Approach to Communication Security. By modeling the interactions between defenders and attackers as games in three types of common communication scenarios, the thesis predicts the adversaries' attacks, determines the set of assets that are most likely to be attacked, and suggests defense strategies for the defenders.
Network/cybersecurity
Wu et al. (2018) [64] develop a game theoretical analysis method for determining the optimal security detection strategies for networked systems that are heterogeneous. Two players in a two-stage game model with complete information are attacker and defender. In the first stage, two players make decisions on whether to keep silence for each network unit or to execute the attack/monitoring actions. In the second stage, the method cautiously determines two important strategic variables that are detection threshold and attack intensity. Necessary and sufficient conditions are then developed. Using a rigorously analysis, these ensure existence of NE for the game . Durkota et al. (2017) [65] study the problem of detecting data exfiltration in computer networks while considering a sequential game of imperfect information. The network administrator selects the thresholds for the detector. However, the attacker chooses how much data to ex filtrate in each time step. Novel algorithms are developed that approximate the optimal defense strategies and are represented in the form of Stackelberg equilibria. Using a case study involving real-world uploads of almost six thousand users to Google Drive, authors analyze the scalability of the algorithms and efficiency of the produced strategies Cui et al. (2017) [66] describe a three-player cybersecurity game that involves an attacker, a defender, and a user. The attacker's strategy is either to forego an attack altogether or to attack the defender or the user. The defender and the user must choose between security levels that can be set at either being standard or enhanced . The decision by the attacker to forego an attack is operationalized as the deterrence. A joint probability distribution over the defender's and user's two options describes their decisions. These options are also known to the attacker. With a joint probability distribution the Coordination between the defender and user can be manipulated. Coordination between the defender and the user influences the attacker deterrence. Horák et al. (2017) [67] suggest proactive cyber defense as a new defense mechanism that is of sequential type. In this mechanism the defender strategically engages the attacker by using cyber deception techniques. By creating and reinforcing his view of the computer system, the defender also influences the attacker's actions. The cyber deception techniques find applications in the field of network security. Quantitative framework of game theory is used to investigate the impact of deception on the attacker's beliefs. The work investigates how the attacker's belief evolves and in turn has an impact on his actions. Alvim et al. (2017) [68] study the interaction between defender and adversary by using a game-theoretic framework that adapts to the specific issues of quantitative information flow. By assuming that both defender and adversary may be active and influence the system during the attack, a general framework of information leakage games is defined in which the payoff function of the game is the information leakage. Methods for finding the solution and the equilibria of various kinds of leakage games are provided, varying according to whether players act simultaneously or sequentially, and to whether the defender can conceal from the adversary the channel used. Lu et al. (2016) [69] study an active cyber defense in which there are strategic attackers and/or strategic defenders. Considering strategic defenders acting against non-strategic attackers, they investigate the consequences of two types of optimal control i.e. of infinite-time horizon type and of the fast type. They determine Nash equilibria of the game and discuss the meanings/implications of their theoretic results for cybersecurity.
Wellman and Prakash (2014) [70] investigate a cyber-defense situation that is adaptive in character. The attacker uses progressive probing to increase his ability to compromise a targeted server. Also, by exploiting a moving-target technique, the defender can erase the attacker's progress. The environment they consider includes asymmetric stealth, multiple resources, and interdependent preferences. Authors combine game-theoretic analysis with systematic simulation over a strategy space. They consider six versions of this environment and identify the corresponding equilibria in each version.
Panaousis et al. (2014) [71] present a study of the optimal investment in cybersecurity controls. Authors model the cybersecurity environment of an organization. They investigate cybersecurity control-games of non-cooperative types. In their model, the attacker exploits various vulnerabilities available to him at various network locations whereas the defender abstracts all defense mechanisms of the organization. Considering a series of control-games, they determine Nash equilibria in those. [72] investigate optimal active cyber defense using a setting in which strategic attackers are faced with strategic defenders. Considering strategic defenders that work against non-strategic attackers, they study two types of optimal control i.e. of infinite-time horizon type and of fast type. The defenders want to minimize their cost whereas the attackers do not consider the issue of cost. They study Nash equilibria for games between strategic defenders and attackers and their implications in cybersecurity.
Considering network security problems, Liang and Xiao (2013) [73] present a review of the existing game-theory based solutions. They divide their applications into two categories: security measurement and attack-defense analysis. They present a brief review of the game models in these categories. They also divide the game models into two types: cooperative game models and non-cooperative game models. The then divide the later type into sub-types. Manshaei et al. (2013) [74] present a review of selected set of works in the areas of computer networks and mobile applications. Within these areas, the works they consider apply game theory in various problems of security and privacy. They divide these works into six categories: security of self-organizing networks, economics of network security, security of the physical and MAC layers, cryptography, anonymity and privacy, and intrusion detection systems. For each category, they then identify game models, security problems, and players. They present a summary of their review of the selected works considering security mechanism designs and equilibrium analysis.
Dritsoula et al. [75] discuss Nash equilibria in intruder classification games. These games involve an intruder that comes with two different types: spy and spammer. They propose a generic game-theoretic model and develop an to analysis of the interactions between two opponents: a classifier, who is the defender, and a malicious attacker. In their model a non-strategic spammer is also present. The NE strategies in polynomial times are derived and two models of intrusion detection are developed.
Menache and Ozdaglar (2011) [76] study the behaviour of selfish agents in networks and study game theoretic models allocating resources among them. The analyze dynamic situations in their game theoretic models that are crucially important for the design and control of networked systems. For the problems of allocating resources in communication networks, they present a review of available game theoretic tools. For the problem of routing in wireline networks, they present a general model. In this model, the congestion problems are emphasized that are caused by delay and packet loss. Their study characterizes the inefficiencies of network equilibria. It also looks into how the network performance is affected by autonomous service providers. Roy et al. (2010) [2] present a survey of game theory as it is applied to the area of network security. They deveop a taxonomy of the existing game theoretic solutions that have been designed to increase the network security. Ai et al. (2017) [77] investigate how the presence of jamming attacks affect the power line communication (PLC) network. They consider a Bayesian game to describe the opponents' interaction. It is the game in which PLC network's goal is to increase the overall expected network capacity to its maximum whereas the jammer node holds an opposite goal. They formulate the problem as games of zero-sum and non-zero-sum types and investigate the impact of total power available to the players on the (Bayesian) equilibria in those games. Given the total power along with the action that the jamming node takes, an appropriate scheme that allocates power can be selected. They also study a case, along with its converse, in which there exists a threshold power such that the actions of the jamming node has no effect on the games played between the legitimate nodes.
Jamming/eavesdropping
Altman et al. (2009) [78] consider jamming as a game in which a jammer is playing against a transmitter. They study how increasing number of jammers impacts the game. In the two jammer case, they show how maximum harm can be brought when the jammers employ strategies that share time. Sagduyu et al. (2009) [79] study the games between two types of players called selfish and malicious transmitters. A utility function characterizes each type that depends on throughput reward and the energy cost. Considering different degrees of uncertainty, Authors derive Bayesian NE strategies. The throughput corresponding to the equilibrium state of selfish nodes is then characterized. The conditions in which the throughput improves are identified while increasing the type uncertainty. Bayesian learning mechanisms are introduced in repeated games so as to update the type beliefs. Authors determine an optimal defense strategy against jamming.
By introducing a game theoretic approach, Han et al. (2009) [80] study the interaction between source and friendly jammers. The source transmits the desired data and friendly jammers provide their assistance to the source by "disguising" the eavesdropper. In the game definition, the friendly jammers are paid by the source in order to interfere the eavesdropper with the objective of increasing is secrecy capacity. Friendly jammers are paid by the source for providing their "jamming service". However, there is a trade-off for the price: Lower price results in lower profit for the jammers whereas with the too much high price the source would not buy the service of jamming power or would consider buying it from other jammers that he can afford. To analyze the game outcome, authors investigate a Stackelberg game and present a distributed algorithm. Their analysis and simulation results show how the trade-off for setting the price and friendly jamming can become effective. With this work, Han et al. develop an anti-eavesdropping algorithm. Basar (1983) [81] consider the problem of transmission in the presence of an intelligent jammer. In order to jam the transmitting sequence, the channel is tapped by the jammer and then feeds back a signal at a given energy level. He introduces a square-difference distortion measure. The jammer needs to maximize this measure whereas the transmitter and the receiver need to minimize it. Using this correspondence, Basar obtains a complete set of optimal policies that correspond to saddle-point. Kashyap et al. (2004) [82] consider a zero-sum mutual information game in which the players consist of a pair engaged in encoding and decoding. Considering the mutual information at input and the output ends of the channel, one player in the pair is the maximizer whereas the jammer is the minimizer. Total power constraints are placed on both the jammer and the encoder and the jammer is given access to the encoder output. Authors determine a unique saddle point of this game. They also obtain a somewhat surprising result stating that the knowing the channel input turns out to be useless to the jammer. Using a zero-sum mutual information game, they also determine an optimal defense strategy. Saad et al. (2009) [83] use a coalitional game to model the physical layer security cooperation problem. The utility in the coalitional game is non-transferable. To explain the coalition formation they propose a distributed algorithm. Using this algorithm, a set of wireless users can self-organize into independent coalitions that are disjoint while the users cooperate autonomously. This is achieved while their secrecy capacity is maximized. The secrecy capacity takes into account the security costs when the information is exchanged. They analyze the coalitional structures when the users cooperate autonomously. In their analysis the users can self-adapt the network topology to environmental changes, an example of which is the mobility. A merge and split coalition algorithm is thus developed.
Wireless networks
With the objective of finding the optimal assignment of base stations for hybrid wireless sensor networks, Lee and Pak (2016) [84] propose a game theoretic model. The defining element of this model include the assumptions of ideal sensing field. Relative to the local selections, this model is shown to be more adaptive and energy efficient.
Smart grid
These are large-scale electrical grids that can amalgamate the actions of the users and other entities connected to it, including generators, consumers and those who can be vulnerable to cyber threats. Smart grids improve the efficiency and peak leveling of power systems. There are a number of studies on the stochastic and dynamic nature of multistage cyber attacks on the smart grids as described below.
Considering smart grid use cases, He and de Meer (2017) [85] study the stochastic and dynamic nature of multistage cyber attacks. To develop an improved description of the interactions between attacker and defender in multistage cyber attack scenarios, they present a stochastic game-theoretic model. To form a common belief about the current game state, they propose a belief-updating mechanism for both players. Authors discuss how to determine NE for the designed game model that is helpful in assessing the threats of multistage cyber attacks.
Considering Singapore electricity market, Srinivasan et al. (2017) [86] evaluate a game theory based dynamic pricing strategy. Their focus is on the residential and commercial sector.
Loni and Parand (2017) [87] present a survey of a number of game theory-based applications to solve relevant problems in smart grid and the answers to three basic questions: i) why cooperation between agents is valuable?, ii) which forms of cooperation are forming?, and iii) why and how game theory can model the cooperation?
The controlling scheme in such grids is the demand side management. Its aim is to optimize several characteristics while using an interactive dynamic pricing scheme. By considering several subscribers who share one common energy supplier, Hajj and Awad (2015) [88] propose a game theoretic approach to the demand side management. Saad et al. (2012) [89] present an overview on the potential of applying game theory to address relevant and timely open problems in three emerging areas that relate to the smart grid: i) microgrid systems ii) demand-side management, and iii) communications. Mohsenian-Rad et al. (2010) [90] present a distributed demand-side energy management system among its users that is autonomous. The model uses a two-way digital communication infrastructure that is assumed to be placed in the smart grid. Using game theory they design an energy consumption scheduling game in which the users are considered as players. The players' strategies are the daily schedules involving their household appliances and loads. Rajtmajer et al. (2017) [91] present a type of one-shot Ultimatum Game in which the individual users, who are interacting with their peers, are modelled as if they are making privacy decisions about the shared content. The effects of such sharing dynamics on the individuals' privacy preferences are analyzed in situation when repeated interactions take place among the users. The conditions are then derived according to which the users' access decisions reach a convergence eventually. This limit is characterized as a function of: a) at the start of the game what are the inherent individual preferences, and ii) users' willingness to concede these preferences over time. Raya et al. (2010) [92] have considered trust versus privacy as a dynamic incomplete information game. The notion of data-centric trust is shown to considerably alleviate the tension between trust and privacy, although at the cost of pooling contributions from several entities. Assuming an environment of privacy-preserving entities, a game-theoretic model of the trust-privacy trade-off is provided and analyzed. The results prove that the use of incentives are helpful in building trust while the privacy loss is kept to its minimal. To illustrate the analysis developed, an optimization of the trust-privacy trade-off is considered that allows revocation of the misbehaving nodes in an ad hoc network. The incentive to build the trust are also investigated.
Trust vs. privacy

Cloud computing
Cloud computing involves house servers connected to the Internet and a number of sites that using those servers. The operation of cloud computing depends in a critical way on cyber components that include servers and routers, and also on the physical components that include fiber and power routes. Cloud computing has new security risks associated with it.
Using game theoretic modelling, Srinivasa et al. (2014) [93] study the problems of resource allocation for cloud users that are NP-Hard. They use a min-max game approach from game theory and find an optimal resource allocation.
Xu and Yu (2014) [94] propose a game theoretic resources allocation algorithm by considering fairness among users and the resources utilization. Djebaili et al. (2014) [95] formulate the data integrity check problem and consider it as a noncooperative game. They perform an in-depth analysis on the NE and the engineering implications behind it. Correctness of the analytic results they present is demonstrated using simulation on a case study which validates the game theoretical model. Han et al. (2013) [96] study a security game model asking how to minimize the attacker's possibility of collocating their Virtual Machines with the targets. This is achieved while maintaining low power consumption for the system and a satisfactory workload balance. Rao et al. (2012) [97] present a game-theoretic approach in order to facilitate provisioning and operation of the infrastructure under uniform cost models.
Cryptocurrencies
Dimitri (2017) [98] considers the bitcoin mining as an all-play contest i.e. as a competition where participants contend with each other to win a prize by investing in computational power, and victory is probabilistic. Bitcoin mining activity is modelled using a simple game theoretic framework, assuming complete information, and by formalizing the activity as an all-pay contest. With at least two active miners, the unique pure strategy NE of the game are determined. Dimitri determines that a higher rate of return on investment outside bitcoin can result in formation of a monopoly.
Houy (2016) [99] considers the bitcoin mining as a speed game between players. Players are miners having different computational powers to solve: a) a mathematical problem, b) bring a proof of work, c) spread their solution, and d) reach consensus among the bitcoin network nodes with it. Nash equilibria in the two-player case are determined analytically. As an example, Nash equilibria are then evaluated in a two-player miners game in which the miners have different computational powers. Laszka et al. (2015) [100] develop a game-theoretic model providing guidelines to ensure that the bitcoin ecosystem remains long-term viable and trustworthy. Their model captures short-term as well as long-term impacts of attacks against bitcoin mining pools. Using this model, authors study the conditions under which peaceful equilibria are achieved, which is the situation when the mining pools have no incentives left to launch attacks against each other. They also study the conditions to achieve one-sided attack equilibria that correspond to situations when one mining pool is marginalized by attacks.
4.11 Cyber-investment and cyber-insurance Tosh et al. (2017) [101] present a model of a three player game which involves organizations, adversary, and insurer. The game is played sequentially and optimal strategies are determined. Using backward induction approach, the subgame perfect equilibrium analysis is conducted to find the optimal strategies for involved players. Panaousis et al. (2014) [71] present a model of the non-cooperative cybersecurity control games between the defender and the attacker. The defender abstracts all defense mechanisms of the organization whereas the attacker has the ability to exploit different vulnerabilities at different network locations.
Challenges to applying game theory to security
Although game theory has been shown to be significant for security, there exist certain challenges that need to be addressed for developing a viable approach to security. Key challenges of applying game theory to security include the complexity of computing an game theoretical equilibrium strategy and the difficulty to properly quantify security parameters such as risk, privacy, and trust. These parameters define the utility functions of the players involved in a security game.
Choosing the appropriate game model for a given security problem turns out to be a challenge for game theory when it is applied to security. The appropriate game model depends on the detail and particular aspects of a problem/application scenario. A two-player game can be a model a security game involving one attacker and one defender. However, a dynamic game would model a security situation with multiple stages for attacking and defending between attackers and defenders.
In the studies that have been presented So far, choosing a game appears to be solely based on intuition. These choices of games are not substantiated by the available data. Another aspect of the security game models is that the players are assumed having unbounded rationality. In real life and experimental studies, the players do not always act with rationality.
Interpretation of game theoretical notions such as mixed strategy Nash equilibrium also appears as a challenge particularly for the security games. The usual approach in game theory in this regard involves considering repeated games whereas many security games can be represented as one-shot games. Even within the game theory community, there is no consensus on how to interpret a mixed strategy. In order to convert the game theoretic results into practical security solutions these challenges need to be addressed.
